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The New Marriage Contract and the
Limits of Private Orderingt
GREGORY S. ALEXANDER*
Marriage isn't what it used to be. Traditionally considered a status-based
institution, marriage is now increasingly a matter of contract. More and more
American couples are executing premarital contracts that expressly define
various legal aspects of their marriage, including their obligations to each other
during marriage and upon divorce. While in the past it was largely a tool of the
rich and famous, the premarital agreement has now become attractive to a much
wider spectrum of married couples.' The rising divorce rate, combined with
expansion in the definition of marital property subject to equitable distribution
upon divorce, are among the major factors fueling the growing interest in
marriage contracts.
To date, the shift from status to contract is far from complete. As Professors
Rasmusen and Stake note in their very interesting and stimulating paper, courts
do not always enforce marriage contracts, and the bases on which they review
such contracts is not entirely clear. The result is that the legal status of the extant
type of marriage contract is somewhat uneasy.2 Moreover, while more couples
are using marriage contracts, most newlyweds, especially first-timers, still rely
t © 1998 by Gregory S. Alexander.
* Professor of Law, Cornell University; Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School,
1997-98. This Response was presented at a Symposium on Law and the New American Family
at Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, on April 4, 1997. I am grateful to
Professors Rasmusen and Stake and to participants in the conference for comments and
suggestions and to the conference organizers, especially Professor Jeffrey Stake, for inviting
me.
1. See Andrde Brooks, Wedding Bells, Dotted Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1992, at 35.
2. There are three different uniform laws regulating the validity of premarital agreements,
the UNIF. PROBATE CODE (amended 1993) ("UPC"), the UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT
(1984) ("UPAA"), and the UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY AcT (1983) ("UMPA"). Section 6-201
of the UPC adopts the writing requirement of section 2 of the UPAA but relaxes the formalities
of execution needed. The UPAA, enacted in about 16 states so far, provides that premarital
contracts are enforceable unless the party seeking to avoid enforcement proves either (1) that
the agreement was involuntary, or (2) that it was unconscionable when made, and (a) that prior
to enforcement, s/he was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the other party's
property or financial obligations, (b) did not voluntarily and expressly waive any right of
disclosure, and (c) did not have adequate knowledge of the other party's property or financial
obligations. See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT AcT § 6(a). The UMPA distinguishes between
pre- and postmarital agreements. As to the former, the standard of validity is basically the same
as that of the UPAA, see UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACr § 10(g); as to postmarital contracts,
it adopts a higher standard of unconscionability, see UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT § 10(f).
Apart from statute, some courts have adopted yet more stringent standards of review. At least
two courts have ruled, for example, that premarital contracts are voidable if they are
substantively unfair, with unfairness measured at the time of enforcement rather than the time
of the agreement. Under this approach, the contract is not enforceable if it leaves the
nonenforcing party without adequate means of support according to her or his accustomed
standard of living. See Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982); McHugh v. McHugh,
436 A.2d 8 (Conn. 1980).
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on the default rules of marriage and divorce that the legal system provides. Still,
things are not as they once were. As recently as 1977, Judge Posner could
accurately state that "explicit marital contracts are rare."3 That statement can no
longer be made. Marriage contracts may not yet be commonplace, but they
certainly are no longer a rarity.4 Once the province of the rich and beautiful (or
at least the rich), marriage contracts have moved into the middle class in recent
years.
The thrust of Professors Rasmusen and Stake's paper is to push the inside of
the marital contract envelope even further. Currently, prenuptial agreements are
primarily devoted to sorting out the property aspects of couples' obligations to
each other, especially the division of assets upon dissolution, either by divorce
or by death. Rasmusen and Stake propose extending the use of contract to cover
a much wider range of issues than the current practice contemplates. They want
couples to be able to define by contract not only the terms of divorce but the
grounds for divorce as well Even more striking perhaps, they propose extending
the province of contract to include conduct during the marriage.
What motivates the movement to expand the permissible scope of marriage
contracts is not knee-jerk contractarian or libertarian ideology. Rather, the
advocates of covenant marriage want to use freedom of contract to enhance
security of contract in the context of marriage. Stated differently, they want to
throw off the traditional limits of private ordering in marriage as a means of
returning to traditional marriage. That tradition, they believe, protected not only
the stability of marriages but also the more dependent spouse better than the
current legal regime does. The current regime, which I will call "NF/ED," is that
of no-fault grounds for divorce and equitable distribution of property upon
divorce. Under this regime, a spouse who is, relatively speaking, less committed
to the marriage and wealthier has strong incentives to opt out of the marriage
than he (because the exiting party usually is the man) had under the traditional
regime, the regime of fault-based divorce and alimony upon divorce (I will call
this traditional regime "FAL"). This is because NF/ED in general imposes fewer
financial burdens on the wealthier ex-spouse than did FAL and because the exit
costs are lower under NF/ED.6 Hence, the obvious solution is to raise the costs
3. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 104 (2d ed. 1977).
4. See Claudia H. Deutsch, More Couples Are Taking No Chances on Love, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 13, 1995, at C10.
5. In this respect their proposal substantially tracks the "covenant marriage" idea adopted
recently in Louisiana. A party to a covenant marriage contract can obtain a divorce only after
counseling and if the other has committed adultery, has committed a felony and been sentenced
to death or imprisonment at hard labor, has abandoned the matrimonial domicile for a period
of one year and constantly refuses to return, has physically or sexually abused the spouse
seeking the divorce or a child of one of the spouses, or if the spouses have been living
separately without reconciliation for a period of two years. If ajudgment of separation from bed
and board was previously obtained, the period of separation is reduced to one year or, if there
is a minor child of the marriage, to one-and-a-half years. See Act of July 15, 1997, No. 1380,
1997 La. Sess. Law Serv. 2358 (West) (to be codified at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:224-:225,
:234, :245, :272-:275, :307-:309, and at LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 102-103).
6. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA.
L. REv. 9 (1990).
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of exit, or at least permit consenting parties to do so by entering into contracts
for covenant marriage.7
Without defending the extant NE/ED regime, I want to offer two reasons for
being skeptical about this proposal." First, marriage is not the type of relationship
in which precommitment is most likely to maximize long-term preferences.
Second, the new restrictive marriage contract represents a very significant
expansion of the domain of private ordering by including within it an
institution-marriage-that historically has been viewed as a matter of public
regulation because of its strong implications for the entire society. The defects
in the current regime of NF/ED do not warrant such a fundamental change in the
relation between society and the institution of marriage.
I. THE COST OF PRECOMMITMENT
Professors Rasmusen and Stake model marriage in market terms, treating it as
a deal between two rational agents. Their goal is to maximize the aggregate
preference satisfaction of the two agents. From that perspective, it is easy to see
why marriage law looks anomalous. Marriage law should be like partnership law,
a matter of private agreement. That it is not is the mistake that they seek to
correct. Their solution is to allow H and W to precommit themselves to each
other in a way that NF/ED marriage law currently does not.' Put in terms first
coined by the economist Albert Hirschman, they ought to be able to contractually
eliminate the exit option, or at least greatly restrict its availability, so that only
two options remain to each of them-loyalty, that is, stick with the other, and
voice, that is, stick with the other but express dissatisfaction to her or him and try
to work things out. Where there is dissatisfaction on the part of one or both
7. Assuming for the moment that this standard diagnosis for what ails the modem marriage
is correct, why is not the cure reform of the legal default rules to return to FAL? After all, as
Professors Rasmusen and Stake acknowledge, initiatives are under way in several states to do
just that. See Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifling the Veil of Ignorance:
Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 495-96 (1998). These initiatives seem
to indicate a growing public awareness that the shift from FAL to NE/ED was a well-
intentioned mistake and now needs to be undone or at least amended in significant ways.
The answer appears to be that Rasmusen and Stake are not confident that the tide in fact has
shifted. Marriage law is in a state of disarray, and its future is ambiguous. Moreover, legal
reform takes time. The no-fault revolution occurred relatively quickly, but it did not occur
overnight. With public opinion so mixed about a return to the traditional FAL regime, any
major shift away from NE/ED will very likely occur slowly. Under these conditions of
uncertainty, private contracting, they argue, provides the quicker, more secure means for
couples who wish to precommit themselves to the traditional obligations of marriage to achieve
their goal. See id. Consequently, they urge "[clourts ... to... enforce private agreements
regarding grounds for divorce and terms of an ongoing marriage." Id. at 465.
8. For a thorough and penetrating analysis of proposals for new forms of marriage
contracts, see Ann Laquer Estin, Economics and the Problem of Divorce, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH.
ROUNDTABLE 517 (1995).
9. For an argument in favor of restrictive marriage contracts explicitly analyzed as a
precommitment device, see ELIZABETH S. SCOTT, MARRIAGE AS A PRECOMMHTMENT
(University of Va. Sch. of Law Working Papers Series No. 97-8, Spring 1997).
1998]
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parties, removing the exit option, as Hirschman's book generally argued,' °
increases the likelihood that the voice option will be taken up effectively.
Recognizing this dynamic regarding the relationship among exit, voice, and
loyalty, the couple could rationally choose to forego (or severely limit the
availability of) the exit option, if only the law would allow them to.
It is not always the case that the unavailability or unattractiveness of the exit
option will lead either to greater loyalty or more effective use of the voice option.
There are many circumstances in organizations in which exit is, practically
speaking, unavailable (e.g., high exit costs), but the result is neither to mitigate
dissatisfaction nor to produce greater efforts to remedy the reasons for the
dissatisfaction. There is such a thing as suffering in silence, as Hirschman
himself recognized. Voice is not costless, and in some organizational settings the
costs can be quite high. I have no data on this, but intuitively and anecdotally it
seems likely that this was the case in more than a trivial number of marriages
under the old regime of FAL.
Moreover, recognizing that the relationship with which we are dealing is a
long-term relationship, one is likely to ask, what happens if, down the road, one
or the other spouse does become dissatisfied with the partner, tries the voice
option, and it does not work? The partner is unwilling or unable to change
enough so that remaining in the relationship continues to satisfy both parties. As
one would expect, Rasmusen and Stake anticipate this concern, and answer it
with the following statement: "Requiring the traditional grounds for divorce
would result in more unhappy couples staying together. The unhappiness of the
couple, however, is not enough reason to prevent them from binding themselves,
unless a case for paternalism can be made."" Not surprisingly, they can find no
credible case for paternalism in this context. The basic idea is that people are the
best judges of what is in their self-interest, and if they believe that binding
themselves into the future will maximize their individual preferences, they ought
to be free to do so.
Now, I have to confess, I am at a bit of a loss to understand this statement.
Rasmusen and Stake appear to be treating the marriage contract as a
precommitment device designed to overcome problems of rationality' 2 But the
problem with which they are dealing is significantly different from the usual case
in which precommitment is rational. The classic instance is that of akrasia, or
weakness of will. If I am weak-willed about getting out of bed in the morning and
I am aware of this, acting rationally, I will put my alarm clock on the other side
of the room from my bed. This is, of course, the familiar "Ulysses" strategy: the
individual, recognizing that she might later change her mind, binds herself to the
course that she initially prefers but would later not prefer and so achieves
consistency. She precommits herself to the initial preference because it
maximizes her preferences over time. The later, inconsistent preference
-sleeping in---derives from weakness of will, and if acted upon, is one that she
knows she would later regret.
10. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 36-40 (1970).
11. Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 7, at 471.
12. For a similar analysis of marriage contracts, see SCOTT, supra note 9.
[Vol. 73:503
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In the marriage setting, the difference in preferences-at Time 1, both wanted
to be married to each for life; at Time 2, one or both want out-is not the result
of weakness of will or of discounting the future. Rather, it results either from
endogenous preference changes which imply some change of character, or from
exogenous factors such as changes in the mate's character, or other external
factors. Regret should not always be a basis for avoiding contractual obligations,
but sometimes it should. That is especially so where there were substantial and
unforeseeable errors in information or other related cognitive defects in the
agreement. Indeed, interfering with consumption choices under these
circumstances is not a straightforward rejection of private preference at all. If a
contracting party lacks relevant information and could not reasonably have
obtained that information, a legal decision to override the choice is not
interference with liberty, at least not obviously so.
Public-choice considerations aside, one way of explaining why the no-fault
revolution occurred in the first place is that society recognized that the risk of
high information costs and cognitive errors is especially high in the marriage
context. In no other relationship is information about the other party's character
more important and more difficult to obtain. Married individuals not only seldom
fully know their mate's character at the time they marry, but they cannot possibly
know what their mate's character will be like in the future. A significant
percentage of divorces occur during the first seven years of marriage. 3 Since
youth at the time of marriage is positively correlated with divorce, it is
unsurprising that the parties to most of these divorces are young. 4 The plausible
inference is that most of these divorces were the result of inadequate information
going into the marriage. Under these circumstances, where the risk of error is
substantial, it is not at all irrational to make the exit option readily available. Nor
is it incompatible with a general concern for individual preference satisfaction
to say that precommitment devices in this context should not be binding.
The most appealing argument in favor of precommitment marriage contracts
is that they would produce more egalitarian marriages by evening the bargaining
positions between husbands and wives. On average,, men and women share
unequally the benefits and burdens of marriage. Men tend to have greater
bargaining power and use that power advantage to satisfy their preferences at the
expense of their wives. 5 The most plausible theory explaining this phenomenon
is that the threat of exit from the marriage is greater for men than it is for women
on average since men tend to have more appealing options outside of marriage
13. See Gay C. Kitson & Helen J. Raschke, Divorce Research: What We Know; What We
Need to Know, J. DivoRcE, Spring 1991, at 1, 12-13.
14. See id.
15. For some evidence supporting these propositions, see Dair L. Gillespie, Who Has the
Power? The Marital Struggle, 33 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 445 (1971); Gerald W. McDonald,
Family Power: The Assessment of a Decade of Theory and Research, 1970-1979, 42 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 841 (1980); Janice M. Steil & Karen Weltman, Marital Inequality: The
Importance of Resources, Personal Attributes, and Social Norms on Career Valuing and the
Allocation ofDomestic Responsibilities, 24 SEX ROLES 161 (1991).
1998]
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than do women. 6 Precommitment marriage contracts, the argument goes, tend to
equalize husbands' and wives' bargaining power by reducing the credibility of
the husband's exit threat. One problem with this argument is that while the
contract may reduce the husband's exit threat, exit is not the only source of
bargaining inequality in marriages. Husbands can and sometimes do rely on
noncooperative forms of conduct during the marriage as an alternative means of
getting their way. Theoretically, a marriage contract could neutralize this source
of bargaining inequality as well by specifying unacceptable forms of conduct by
each party. Indeed, this is part of why Professors Rasmusen and Stake argue in
favor of permitting marriage contracts that regulate intramarital conduct. But
marriage is too unpredictable and too complex a relationship to allow parties to
draft a long-term contract that would regulate all of the relevant points of
conduct and specify meaningful standards of performance. A conduct-regulating
marriage contract would inevitably be so open-ended that it would fail to
preclude opportunistic conduct by either party.
A second reason why such contracts are unlikely to succeed in creating more
egalitarian relationships between husbands and wives is that men who in fact
have greater bargaining power are the very men least likely to agree to such a
contract. Faced with the demand to agree to a contract restricting exit or
regulating intramarital conduct, such men are most likely to look for a different,
more "pliable" partner. Only if such contracts became a near-universal
practice-a very unlikely development-would this option be unavailable.
Finally, my guess is that, given the notorious assumption of newlyweds that
their marriage will be among the fifty percent of marriages that work, most
people will not use the new marriage contract. This will be especially true if, as
seems likely, the man is the more opportunistic and therefore disinclined to enter
into such a contract, and the woman lacks either information about their
availability or wants to avoid derailing the marriage by insisting that her
prospective partner enter into a contract severely limiting both his exit and
intramarital options. Intended as a tool to benefit women with weaker bargaining
positions, these contracts would, as the law of unintended consequences predicts,
produce perverse results.
II. MARRIAGE AS A MATTER OF PUBLIC ORDERING
Thus far, my discussion has engaged Professors Rasmusen and Stake on their
own grounds. That is, I have remained within the framework of rational-choice
theory in responding to arguments in favor of their new marriage contract. I now
want to approach their paper from a different perspective, one that argues that
maximizing the satisfaction of a couple's aggregate preferences should not be the
sole criterion by which we evaluate the desirability of the new form of marriage
contract. Marriage is not strictly a private matter, and recent proposals for new
16. See, e.g., Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, Bargaining and Distribution in
Marriage, J. ECON. PERsP., Fall 1996, at 139; Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak,
Noncooperative Bargaining Models of Marriage, 84 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERs & PROC. 132
(1994).
[Vol. 73:503
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types of marriage contracts expand the boundaries of private ordering in ways
that fail to respect the strong and legitimate interest that society as a whole has
in the regulation of marriage.
I begin with an extreme example. Suppose, as implausible as it may seem, that
a couple has with genuinely mutual consent entered into a marriage contract
allowing the husband to beat his wife if she serves dinner late. I would hope that
we could all agree that this contract should never be enforceable, no matter how
genuinely consensual the agreement and no matter what compensation or
consideration is provided to the wife. Such a contractual term should be per se
unenforceable for the obvious reason that it blatantly and grossly offends the
widely shared social values of human dignity, respect, and equality. The point of
this example is to emphasize what I had thought was common ground: that there
are many spheres of social activity in which the domain of private ordering is
properly narrowed by shared social values; and that marriage is one of these
areas. Professors Rasmusen and Stake's article, together with recent legislation
permitting precommitment marriage contracts, 7 indicate that this shared
commitment regarding the limits of private ordering is no longer common
ground. Before we release the restrictions on the domains of private ordering,
though, we ought to acknowledge that we are giving up. Marriage is not like
widgets. It is not a strictly private affair, and neither are marriage contracts.
Historically, very little, if anything within marriage, was left to private
ordering because marriage was considered a sacred rather than a secular
institution. Marriage was a sacrament according to Christian doctrine, for
example. That perception has changed, of course, but vestiges of it remain.
Though largely secularized now, marriage remains a quasi-public institution, a
relationship created through official state sanction rather than through private
agreement alone. An institution is a legitimate public institution when it directly
implicates public interests or shared public values. For all of its changes, that
remains true of marriage not only because of the obvious public interest with
respect to children but also because marriage, for better or worse, remains the
primary foundation of the family, which is the foundational unit of our society's
structure.
The public aspect of marriage does not rule out all forms of private control
over the terms of marriage. Some forms of marriage contracts are permitted
today, and properly so. By and large, however, these are limited to issues
concerning the parties' property obligations to each other upon dissolution.
Those obligations intrude far less on public interests and values than would the
kind of marriage contract that Rasmusen and Stake's proposal contemplates, and
even then, courts often regulate marital property arrangements to ensure that they
do not violate the legitimate public interests in the welfare of the two parties,
especially the one having a weaker bargaining position. The courts' wariness
about these contracts does not bode well for the new marriage contract, which
takes private ordering to a different plane.
17. See Kevin Sack, Louisiana Approves Measure to Tighten Marriage Bonds, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 1997, atAl.
1998]
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My point is not to defend the extant NF/ED regime. It is flawed and needs
correction. But those defects should be corrected directly and universally rather
than through an unprecedented extension of the reach of private ordering.
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